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Abstract 
This paper finds a positive impact of trade liberalization on labor-demand elasticities in the Indian 
manufacturing sector using industry-level data disaggregated by states. These elasticities turn out 
to be negatively related to protection levels that vary across industries and over time. 
Furthermore, we find that these elasticities are higher for Indian states with more flexible labor 
regulations where they are also impacted more by trade reforms. Finally, we find that after the 
reforms, volatility in productivity and output gets translated into larger wage and employment 
volatility, theoretically a possible consequence of larger labor-demand elasticities. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade reforms, even though considered to be welfare enhancing in the aggregate, do not have a 
uniform impact on all sections of society.  Most trade economists like to think about the impact of 
these reforms in terms of their impact on capitalists and workers. For example, in the presence of 
intersectoral factor mobility, opening up an economy to international trade in goods will help 
labor and hurt capital or vice versa, depending on whether the country’s comparative advantage is 
in labor- or capital-intensive products. In fact, there is an important, ongoing debate on whether 
trade hurts or benefits unskilled labor relative to skilled workers (the owners of human capital), to 
which already many well-known scholars in the area have contributed.
1  
A new aspect of the trade-labor linkage that has received some attention in recent years is 
the impact of international trade in goods on the own-price elasticity of labor demand. The 
importance of this element of the labor-market impact of trade was first emphasized by Rodrik 
(1997). He argues that trade makes the demand for labor more elastic which in turn leads to larger 
employment and wage shocks as a result of given vertical shifts in the labor demand curve 
(arising from shocks to productivity or to output demand). Also, this increase in elasticity leads to 
the erosion of the bargaining power of labor vis-à-vis capital in the sharing of supernormal 
profits. And finally, it also results in labor bearing a larger burden of the impact of non-wage 
labor costs. Thus, through this channel, workers are placed under greater pressure as a result of 
trade liberalization (see Slaughter (1997) for a detailed discussion of these effects).
2  
Why does an increase in openness lead to an increase in labor-demand elasticity? There 
are two main channels that Rodrik (1997) points out. Firstly, trade reforms allow cheaper imports 
of intermediate and capital inputs as well as of semi-finished goods and unassembled parts for 
                                                 
1 Important contributions to the literature on the impact of international trade (and globalization in general) on wages 
and wage inequality have been made by Borjas and Ramey (1995), Feenstra (2000), Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997), 
Harrigan (1998), Harrison and Hanson (1999), Hanson and Harrison (1999), Haskel and Slaughter (2001), Lawrence 
and Slaughter (1993), Revenga (1992, 1997),and  Slaughter  (1999). 
2 In this context, we would also like to point out that this very impact of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticity 
will, in periods of sustained productivity growth, lead to higher wage and employment growth than prior to the reforms.   
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assembly/finishing in the importing country.  All these imports are substitutes for the services of 
domestic labor. Thus substitution possibilities in production increase with the availability of 
possibly cheaper and a larger variety of inputs.  
The second channel works through one of Hicks-Marshallian laws of factor demand 
which can be stated as follows: “The demand for anything is likely to be more elastic, the more 
elastic is the demand for any further thing which it contributes to produce” (See Hicks (1963) and 
Slaughter (2001)). Unlike the first channel, which works through what is often called the 
“substitution effect”, the second channel works through the “scale effect” (see Hamermesh 
(1993)). It is the derived nature of input demand that drives this effect. More specifically, in the 
presence of a higher output demand elasticity, a given percentage change in output price, 
resulting from a change in the wage, will lead to a larger percentage change in the output demand 
(and thus in the scale of production), which in turn calls for a greater percentage change in 
employment. Given that trade liberalization leads to the greater availability of substitutes for any 
product (and thus to greater substitution possibilities in consumption), product-demand elasticity 
increases
3 which in turn, as explained above, raises factor-demand elasticities.  
The first paper that provides a very systematic and rigorous empirical investigation of the 
impact of the hypothesized positive effect of trade on labor-demand elasticities is Slaughter 
(2001). Using four-digit industry-level data for the US for the period 1961-91, he finds mixed 
support for the hypothesis. While own-price elasticities of the demand for production workers 
have kept increasing over time, Slaughter finds no such trend for non-production workers. 
However, he also finds that time, by itself, is a better predictor of these elasticities than his trade-
related variables, which lose (retain) explanatory power in the presence of time dummies or a 
common trend in the case of production (nonproduction) labor.  Another paper, by Krishna, Mitra 
                                                 
3 Levinsohn (1993), Harrison (1994) and Krishna and Mitra (1998) show that in Turkey, the Ivory Coast and India 
respectively, trade reforms resulted in lower price-marginal cost markups which implicitly implies a more elastic 
product demand curve perceived by individual firms.  
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and Chinoy (2001), uses plant level data from Turkey to examine the same hypothesis and finds 
no empirical support for it.
4 
In this paper, using industry-level data disaggregated by 15 major states, we empirically 
examine the impact of the Indian trade reforms, initiated in 1991, on labor-demand elasticities in 
the manufacturing sector. The time period spanned by our dataset is 1980-97 and so we see 
whether these elasticities were higher in the post-reform period, 1992-97 as compared to the 
previous period, 1980-91. We also see whether these elasticities are related to protection 
measures that vary over time and across industries. As our data are by industry and by state, we 
investigate whether these elasticities and the changes in them, as a consequence of trade 
liberalization, vary across states. In particular, India’s states differ in terms of the restrictions they 
place on the firing and hiring of workers.  By distinguishing between states with “rigid” and 
“flexible” labor markets on the basis of such restrictions, we are able to examine the relationships 
between labor demand elasticities, trade liberalization, and labor market rigidity.  
We try various specifications – constant-output, constant-capital and partial-adjustment 
labor demand models and their various meaningful combinations. Across all these models, there 
are three robust findings. First, labor demand elasticities go up after the trade reforms. Second, 
we find that the higher the protection an industry receives, the lower is its labor-demand 
elasticity. This empirical regularity seems to hold over time and across industries. And third, 
states with more flexible labor markets (i.e., states in which there are fewer restrictions on the 
hiring and firing of labor) not only have a more elastic demand for labor, the impact of trade 
reforms on their labor-demand elasticity is also greater. 
We then go on to actually simulate the effects of these estimated changes in elasticities 
on wages and employment. These simulations are based on alternative assumed values of labor-
supply elasticities. We find that the low initial values of our estimated labor-demand elasticities 
                                                 
4 Maskus and Bohara (1985) use data for one year to see the relationship between labor-demand elasticities and 
product-demand conditions in US manufacturing.   5
insulate workers from shocks to labor demand in the pre-reform period, but the substantial 
increase in these elasticities after the reforms can, under certain conditions, result in a fairly large 
increase in wage and employment volatility for given volatility in the position of the labor 
demand function. We also carry out a direct empirical test of this hypothesis. We find that there is 
some evidence that after the reforms a given level of volatility in total factor productivity gets 
transformed into larger volatility in wages and employment. Also, a given increase in TFP and 
output volatility gets transformed into greater increases in wage and employment volatility in the 
post-reform period. 
Thus, we believe, that the contribution of the paper is three-fold. It tests the hypothesized 
link between trade and labor-demand elasticity for a very large, developing country. This 
largeness also has the feature of diverse labor institutions/regulations across states.  By exploiting 
this diversity we are able to examine whether the effects of trade reforms on labor-demand 
elasticities are contingent on the nature of labor market regulations, making this the first paper 
that separates the effects of trade reforms and labor regulations and at the same time looks at the 
interaction between the two. To our knowledge, this paper also provides the first direct test of the 
hypothesized impact of trade liberalization on the transmission of TFP and output volatility into 
the labor market. 
 
2.  Indian policy framework 
2.1  The Trade Reforms in India 
In the 1980’s, India experienced moderate economic growth. However, this growth was 
accompanied by large macroeconomic imbalances reflected in the rapid rise in the fiscal deficit to 
GDP ratio, in foreign commercial debt and in the debt service ratio  (all these being consequences 
mainly of fiscal indiscipline). These problems were further accentuated by the Gulf War that 
drastically raised the price of oil. At this time, the general elections of 1991 brought to power a 
new government that inherited probably the world’s most complex and restrictive trade regime   6
based on a firm belief in export pessimism and in the effectiveness of import substitution. Upon 
assuming power, this new government approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 
help in solving its external payments problem which by then had assumed crisis-like proportions.  
The IMF loans came attached with the strong conditionality of major economic reforms which 
were initiated almost immediately.  Given several earlier attempts to avoid IMF loans and the 
associated conditionalities, the large number of members of the new cabinet who had been 
cabinet members in past governments with inward-looking trade policies and the heavy reliance 
on tariffs as a source of revenues, these reforms came as a surprise.  
The major trade reform objectives announced by the Indian government in July, 1991 
included the removal of most licensing and other non-tariff barriers on all imports of intermediate 
and capital goods, the broadening and simplification of export incentives, the removal of export 
restrictions, the elimination of the trade monopolies of the state trading agencies, the 
simplification of the trade regime, the reduction of tariff levels and their dispersion and the full 
convertibility of the domestic currency for foreign exchange transactions. Subsequently, the 
maximum tariff was reduced from 400 percent to 150 percent in July 91, to 110 percent in 
February 92, to 85 percent in February 93, 64% in February 94 and to roughly 45 percent by 
1997-98. The mean tariff went from 128 percent before July 1991 to 94 percent in February 92, 
71 percent by February 93 , 55 percent in February 94 and to roughly 35 percent by 1997-98. The 
standard deviation of tariffs during this period went down from 41 percentage points to roughly 
15.  Table 1 provides tariffs and percentage changes in the period 1988-97 for different industries 
in the Indian manufacturing sector.
5 We see steady and substantial reductions in tariffs right 
through this entire period.  
As far as the non-tariff barriers were concerned, prior to 1991, there were quantitative 
restrictions on 90 percent of the value added in the manufacturing sector. In April 92, all the 
                                                 
5  The construction of these tariff rates is described in Section 4.2.  
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twenty six import licensing lists were done away with.  However a “negative list” (from which 
most intermediate and capital goods were excluded) of items, whose imports were prohibited, 
was introduced, thereby eliminating many of the licensing procedures and discretionary decisions 
of the previous import regime.  
There were also changes in the exchange rate. The Indian Rupee was devalued 20 percent 
against the US dollar in July 1991 and further devalued in February 92 when an explicit dual 
exchange market was introduced. The percentage reduction in tariffs and non-tariff barriers were 
much greater than the percentage devaluation (and even larger relative to the real exchange rate 
devaluation on account of fairly high inflation, hitting roughly 14 percent, during the initial years 
of the reforms).Therefore, the import enhancing effect of the trade reforms should have more than 
offset the import reducing effect of the exchange rate devaluation. 
 
2.2  Labor Markets:  Regulations and Rigidity 
While a comprehensive review of India’s labor markets is beyond the scope of this paper some 
key features of labor regulations in India and their implications for labor market rigidity in the 
manufacturing sector are worth noting.
6   First, legislative authority over labor issues falls with 
both the central (federal) government as well as individual state governments so that the latter 
have the authority to amend central legislations or to introduce subsidiary legislations.  In 
addition, the enforcement of many labor regulations, even those enacted by the central 
government, lies with the state governments.  Both factors suggest that there may be considerable 
variation in labor regulations and/or their enforcement across India’s states.   
Second, a number of pro-reform policymakers and analysts believe that India’s labor 
laws have made labor markets in the manufacturing sector rigid in the sense of placing serious 
impediments in the hiring and firing of workers.  As per the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA), for 
example, it is necessary for firms employing more than 100 workers to obtain the permission of 
                                                 
6  See Dutt (2003) for a more detailed discussion of India’s labor market regulations.   8
state governments in order to retrench or layoff workers.
7, 
8 While the IDA does not prohibit 
retrenchments, critics of the act argue that it is difficult to carry them out.  Datta-Chaudhuri 
(1996) argues, for example, that states have often been unwilling to grant permission to retrench, 
perhaps for reasons of political expediency. Provisions for job security among individual workers 
come additionally from the operation of the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act.  This 
act requires all employers with 100 or more workers (50 in certain states) to specify to workers 
the terms and conditions of their employment.  While the Act seeks to make labor contracts 
complete, fair, and legally binding it has some features which may interfere with quick 
adjustments to changing conditions.  In particular, worker consent is required in order to modify 
job descriptions or move workers from one plant to another in response to changing market 
conditions.  The problem, according to some analysts, is that the workings of India’s Trade Union 
Act (TUA) make it difficult to obtain worker consent. While the TUA allows any seven workers 
in an enterprise to form and register a trade union, it has no provisions for union recognition (for 
example, via a secret ballot).  The result, according to Anant (2000), has been multiple unions 
(within the same establishment) with rivalries common across unions so that a requirement of 
worker consent for enacting changes “can become one of consensus amongst all unions and 
groups, a virtual impossibility” (page 251). 
It is important to note, however, that not all analysts agree that India’s labor laws have 
made for a rigid labor market.  In particular, an important counter-argument to the views 
expressed above is that India’s labor regulations relating to job-security have been either ignored 
(Nagaraj, 2002) or circumvented through the increased usage of temporary or contract labor (see, 
                                                 
7  Until 1976, the provisions of the IDA were fairly uncontroversial.  The IDA allowed firms to layoff or retrench 
workers as per economic circumstances as long as certain requirements such as the provision of sufficient notice, 
severance payments, and the order of retrenchment among workers (last in first out) were met.  An amendment in 1976 
(the introduction of Chapter VB), however, made it compulsory for employers with more than 300 workers to seek the 
prior approval of the appropriate government before workers could be dismissed.  A further amendment in 1982 
widened the scope of this regulation by making it applicable to employers with 100 workers or more.   
8 The term layoff refers to a temporary or seasonal dismissal of a group of workers due to slackness of current demand.   
Retrenchments,  on the other hand, denote permanent dismissals of a group of workers.  Both terms may be 
distinguished from “termination” which refers to separation of an individual from his or her job.   9
in particular,  Datta, 2003 and Ramaswamy, 2003).
9  Ultimately, whether India’s labor laws have 
created significant rigidities in labor markets or not is an empirical issue. 
 
3. Theory 
3.1  Constant-Output Labor Demand Elasticity and Trade Liberalization 
  Let us consider the following cost minimization problem of a representative firm: 
mM wL rK Min M L K + + , , subject to  ) , , ( M L K F Q =                          (1) 
where r, w and m are the user cost of capital, the wage rate and the materials price respectively, 
while K, L and M represent capital, labor and materials and Q is output. It must be noted that the 
above minimization can be written in terms of nominal factor prices or equivalently in terms of 
real factor prices (in units of the output), as with the former we just have a scaled up minimand of 
the latter.
10   
The above optimization yields the following conditional labor demand function and 
constant-output labor-demand elasticity respectively: 
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to other inputs and sL is the share of 
labor in overall output. Note that this formula is based on the assumption of constant returns to 
scale and perfect competition.
11 If our production function is Cobb-Douglas, given by 
γ β α M L K Q =  (and not necessarily constant returns to scale, and if the market is not necessarily 
perfectly competitive), the labor demand function can be written as: 
Q m r w const L ln
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9 Our measure of employment of production labor includes, permanent, temporary and contract. 
10 If P is the product price, then minimizing cost in terms of given real factor prices is just minimizing (1/P) times what 
would have been minimized if cost had been defined in terms of nominal factor prices. Thus, the elasticities of the 
constant-output labor demand function with respect to the nominal and real factor prices should be the same. 
11 The assumptions of constant returns and perfect competition ensure that the elasticity of output with respect to any 
factor equals its share in output and the rewards to different factors exhaust the total output.   10
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the further assumption of  perfect competition, we have  β = L s  (i.e., the share of labor in output 
equals the elasticity of output with respect to labor in the firm’s production function). 
Furthermore, σ = 1 under Cobb-Douglas. Thus, we can see how our elasticity formula under a 
Cobb-Douglas technology is related to earlier formula in equation (2).  
  Thus, what we learn from all of the above is that the wage elasticity of the constant-
output labor demand is increasing in the elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to other 
inputs and decreasing with respect to the elasticity of output with respect to labor (decreasing in 
labor’s output share under perfect competition and constant returns to scale). Trade liberalization 
facilitates the import of larger varieties of inputs and therefore, increases the elasticity of 
substitution of labor with respect to all other inputs. In other words, new imported material and 
capital inputs can substitute the services of domestic workers. Moreover, if we consider the 
overall production function of a firm as an aggregation of production functions for different 
stages of production, then trade liberalization, by facilitating imports of semi-finished and 
unassembled products (to be finished and assembled in the home country) will reduce the share of 
labor in the overall sales of the industry. Thus, both the increase in σ and the fall in sL work in the 
same direction towards raising the labor demand elasticity. 
  Another issue we will focus on in this paper is the effect of labor regulations. As noted in 
Section 2.2 India’s labor laws are widely believed to have led to restrictions on the hiring and 
firing of workers, thereby limiting substitution possibilities in response to changes in factor 
prices. Under such conditions, there is going to be a difference between the “effective” 
production function and the “ideal” production function (given just by the available technological   11
know-how) faced by firms, the elasticity of substitution σ being lower for the former than for the 
latter. 
 
3.2  Unconstrained and Capital-Constrained Labor-Demand Functions: Imperfect versus 
Perfect Competition, Real- versus Nominal-Wage Elasticities 
Now, we focus on the profit maximization problem of the firm in which the output is not taken as 
given but is determined endogenously, given factor prices. We first  work with a model of 
monopolistic competition, where each firm faces its less than infinitely elastic demand curve and 
where there is assumed to be no strategic interaction between firms.
12  Thus a representative firm 
in an industry is assumed to face an inverse demand curve of the type: 
ε θ
/ 1 − = Q P P                (4) 
where P and Q are the price and quantity of the product, ε is the constant product demand 
elasticity faced by a representative firm and P denotes the industry average price.
13  The 
production function is assumed to be of a Cobb-Douglas type and is given by 
γ β α M L K Q =             (5) 
where K, L and M are the capital, labor and material inputs used by this representative firm. 
The firm is assumed to face infinitely elastic factor supplies, i.e., it takes factor prices as 
given. Partially differentiating profits with respect to the lth input and equating it to zero gives us 
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where r, w and m denote the nominal user cost of capital, the wage rate and material price 
respectively. From the above three first order conditions, we get the following labor demand 
function: 
                                                 
12 This approximates a situation in which there are a large number of varieties and each firm is an infinitesimal player 
but has some power over the pricing of it product (variety). 
13 In an industry with a continuum of firms,  P approximates the price index of close substitutes.   12
) / ln( ) / ln( ) / ln( ln 0 P w P r P w L m w r δ δ δ δ + + + =            (7) 
which is a function in terms of the variables taken as exogenous by the firm – factor prices and 
the industry average price. If we are looking at industry employment with n identical firms, then 
it is just n times the firm output at any given vector of real factor prices and so in the log version 
above the extra “ln n” gets absorbed in the constant term.  All the coefficients in the above 
equation are all functions of ε. The own price elasticity of labor demand (with respect to the 
industry product wage) and the partial derivative of its absolute value with respect to the product 






































































δl           (8) 
Thus, the absolute value of labor demand elasticity is increasing in the absolute value of the 
product demand elasticity.  
If capital is held fixed, then we work on the basis of only two first order conditions, 
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whose absolute value clearly again is increasing in ε.  
  Now let us instead look at a price taking (perfectly competitive) firm in an industry with 
perfect substitutes (homogeneous commodity). Each firm has to sell the product at the industry 
price P  and the firm’s  profit maximization problem can be written as: 
mM wL rK M L K P Max M L K − − −
γ β α
, ,                (10)   13
which gives us a labor demand function such that the log of labor demanded is again linear in the 
logs of  P m P w / , /  and  P r / .
14  Again in an industry with symmetric firms, the difference 
between the industry and firm log labor demanded (as a function of the logs of real factor 
rewards) is just in the constant term.  The unconstrained elasticity of the demand for labor with 
respect to the product (real) wage and the constant-capital elasticity (conditional on capital) are 
given respectively by: 
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       (11) 
We can see the two elasticities in (11) are independent of the product demand elasticity and they 
only depend on the elasticities of output with respect to the variable factors. When we depart 
from the Cobb-Douglas specification, they will additionally depend on the elasticity of 
substitution σ. Thus, while the elasticity of labor demand with respect to real product wage 
depends on product demand elasticity in the case of an imperfectly competitive industry, it is not 
so in the case of a perfectly competitive industry. However, it must be noted that from the point 
of view of the industry as a whole, the price  P  is endogenous. Given the product demand curve, 
this price will be endogenous to nominal factor rewards, w, r and m as the output supply for any 
given output price will depend on these nominal factor prices. Taking this endogeneity into 
account, we can easily calculate the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the nominal wage 
rate and will show that this elasticity will depend on the product demand elasticity even under 
price-taking behavior by firms in the product market. This means that under imperfect 
competition, there is an additional positive effect of product demand elasticity, when the elasticity 
of labor demand is calculated with respect nominal wages instead of real wages. We first focus 
here on the elasticity conditional on capital, which can be written as follows: 
                                                 
14 The above maximization problem is defined only if  1 ≤ + + γ β α . Also, the size of the firm at any given price is 
undefined if  1 = + + γ β α . This is not really a problem under CRS as the conditions of the equality of price to average 
cost (in long-run equilibrium), the equality of market demand to supply and identical firms will determine firm size in 
equilibrium.   14
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Noting that  []

























, we can write the 
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Equating output demand to its supply and taking further derivatives, we have 
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which gives us  
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  We finally look at the case of perfect competition and constant returns to scale with all 
factors variable, where the unconditional labor demand elasticity (from profit maximization), 
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Thus the elasticity of labor demand with respect to the nominal wage is a weighted average of the 
elasticity of substitution and the elasticity of demand, the weights respectively being the share of 
factors other than labor and that of labor respectively. As explained before, the elasticity of 
substitution goes up due to trade liberalization. Also, the increased availability of substitutes for 
the final good will make the output demand also more elastic. Thus for a fixed share of labor in 
output, as a consequence of liberalization, both the product demand elasticity and the elasticity of   15
substitution between factor inputs will move the labor demand  elasticity in the upward direction. 
However, as explained in the case of the constant-output labor demand elasticity, the share of 
labor in total output may also go down, which can make the direction of movement of this 
unconstrained (or even the capital-constrained) labor demand elasticity ambiguous. This makes 
empirical work in this area all the more important. And, finally as explained before, the labor 
demand elasticity will also be determined by labor regulations through their impact on the 
effective σ.  
 
3.3 Adjustment Costs and the Dynamic Labor Demand Function 
We now know how trade liberalization could make labor demand more elastic. However, what 
we have focused on so far is the firm’s ideal labor demand and the actual labor demand may be 
different from the ideal due to the presence of rigidities and frictions in the labor market. So we 
introduce labor market frictions in this subsection.  Let us denote the actual labor demand (in log 
terms) by l
A and the ideal labor demand (again in logs) by l. We denote lagged employment by   
l
A
-1.  Let 0 < λ < 1 denote the extent of labor market frictions that act as impediments in the hiring 
and firing of labor. We then write the actual labor demand as a weighted average of the ideal 
labor demand and the lagged level of employment, the relative weight on lagged employment 
being increasing in labor market rigidity. Therefore, our actual labor demand function can be 
written as 
l l l
A A ) 1 ( 1 λ λ − + = −   ⇔        ) )( 1 ( 1 1
A A A l l l l − − − − + = λ            (17) 
This equation represents a partial adjustment model, 1 - λ being the speed of adjustment (which is 
negatively related to labor market rigidity). The model suggests that only a part of the gap 
between desired and actual employment is closed every period and the proportion of the gap 
closed is increasing in labor market flexibility. After plugging in the equation for our ideal labor 
demand into the actual labor demand equation, we have   16
) ln ln ln )( 1 ( 0 1 m r w l l m r w
A A δ δ δ δ λ λ + + + − + = −             (18) 
where  m r w l m r w ln ln ln 0 δ δ δ δ + + + =  stands for ideal labor demand function. In place of this 
unconstrained demand function, we can substitute the conditional labor demand function. As we 
can clearly see, even when we are estimating the actual labor demand function, for given λ the 
elasticity of this actual labor demanded should increase with trade liberalization and decrease 
with the restrictiveness of labor regulations. We will from now on call (1 – λ)δw the short-run 
elasticity of labor demand and δw , irrespective of whether we are using the unconstrained or the 
capital/output constrained labor demand as the ideal labor demand within the overall actual, 
dynamic labor demand function.  
It is important to note that restrictive labor laws are not the only reason for deviations 
between actual and ideal labor demand.  For example, since layoffs may reduce efficiency by 
lowering the morale of remaining employees firms may respond by adjusting labor more slowly 
than otherwise (Hamermesh, 1993).  Additionally, given that hiring workers is a costly process – 
involving search costs, training costs, and possibly disruptions in production as the flow of work 
across plants is reorganized – firms may “hoard labor” in response to what may only be a 
temporary decline in product demand.  Actual employment may therefore exhibit stickiness in the 
absence of any regulatory restriction on layoffs.  Moreover, regulatory restrictions may interact 
with these other factors in complex ways.  While more restrictive labor laws make the “λ” larger 
by introducing impediments in the hiring and firing of labor, they may generate some offsetting 
effects on the value of λ.   In particular, more restrictive labor laws can influence negatively the 
overall investment climate.  A deterioration of the latter could lower λ by reducing labor 
hoarding, investments in human capital such as expenditure on worker training, and job 
turnover.
15 
                                                 
15  As will be pointed out in Section 4.2 below, Indian states with flexible labor markets tend to be rated by managers as 
having a good investment climate.   These states also tend to be India’s most dynamic and fast growing states (World 
Bank, 2003).  Thus temporary shocks, due to demand or wage volatility, for example, are more likely to lead to labor   17
3.4 Labor-Demand Elasticity and Wage and Employment Volatility 
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where 
D η and 
S η  represent the absolute values of labor demand and labor supply elasticities 
respectively. At stands for the vertical intercept of the inverse labor-demand function and changes 
in it reflect changes in labor productivity or in output demand conditions.  In labor market 
equilibrium, we have 
) / 1 ( ) / 1 (
ln
ln ,
) / 1 ( ) / 1 (


















=         (20) 
Thus, we have  
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These derivatives measure the proportion of the volatility of At that gets transmitted as wage and 
employment volatility and so measure the strength of this transmission. Thus an increase  in the 
labor demand elasticity will mean that for a given percentage increase (or decrease) in At, we get 
a larger percentage increase (or decrease) in wage and employment. Thus, for a given volatility in 
At, we will get bigger volatility in wage and employment. However, it also means that during 
periods of sustained growth in At, we also get larger growth rates of  wage and employment 
arising from a given growth rate of At.  Thus trade reforms can lead to bigger volatility in wages 
and employment. However, it can possibly also lead to faster growth in wages and employment if 
total factor productivity is growing at a constant positive rate. 
 
4.  Estimation Issues and Data 
4.1 Estimation Issues 
                                                                                                                                                 
hoarding in states with flexible labor markets since firms in these states are more likely to expect and have better 
prospects for recovery and growth.    18
Obtaining estimates of the labor demand function are central to determining how trade 
liberalization and labor regulations have affected workers.  In what follows we describe our 
specifications of the labor demand function and discuss various estimation related issues. 
We estimate two types of labor demand equations: one which is conditional on output  
and another which is conditional on capital.  As pointed out in Section 3, the former allows us to 
infer the effect of trade liberalization and labor market regulations on labor demand elasticity (via 
their impact on substitution possibilities in production) while the latter captures additionally the 
effect of trade liberalization on labor demand elasticity (via its impact on product demand 
elasticities).
16 The output constrained labor demand function takes the form: 
∑ ∑ + + + + + = −
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where L denotes the employment of production workers in industry i, state s and year t, f 
represents factor prices (wages, w; user cost of capital, r; and material prices, m in terms of the 
notation of Section 3 above)
17, TP stands for trade policy and may vary by industry and over time, 
LF represents labor market flexibility across states, Q is output, Y represents year dummies, µis is 
an industry-state effect, and εist is a white noise error term.  The effects of trade liberalization and 
labor market flexibility on labor demand elasticity are captured by the coefficients of the 
interaction terms involving w and TP and w and LF, respectively.
18   The specification of the 
capital constrained labor demand function is identical other than (i) the substitution of lnQ with 
                                                 
16  Note, however, that the elasticity of labor demand derived from the capital constrained labor demand  function will 
not incorporate substitution possibilities between labor and capital.   
17  Two factors led us to use nominal factor prices rather than real product factor prices (i.e., factor prices deflated by 
product prices) in estimation.  First, product prices are endogenous at the industry level. Thus using nominal factor 
prices can alleviate endogeneity concerns. Second, as explained in Section 3.2, the elasticity of labor demand with 
respect to the real product wage will not depend on product demand elasticity if an industry is competitive.  To make 
sure that we do not miss out on the effects of changes in product demand elasticities on labor demand elasticities we 
use nominal factor prices.  It may be noted, however, that results using real product factor prices were very similar to 
those based on nominal factor prices. 
18  Thus if TP is measured in terms of tariff rates then a positive estimate of δ
*
wTP (i.e., [1-λ]δ wTP  in terms of the 
notation of equation 18) implies that tariff reductions are associated with an increase in labor demand elasticity.  
Similarly, if LF =1 if the labor market is flexible (and zero otherwise), then a positive value for δ
*
wLF implies that labor 
market flexibility is associated with an increase in labor demand elasticity.   19
lnK and (ii) omission of all terms involving the user cost of capital from the right hand side of 
equation 22. Of course, the parameters of the capital constrained labor demand function have 
different interpretations. We also estimate the specification that does not allow for any adjustment 
costs (i.e., the restricted model with λ = 0 which is a static labor-demand function). 
There are several issues pertaining to specification that are worth highlighting.  First, our 
choice of estimating conditional labor demand functions is practical.  Shocks to product demand 
are likely to move labor demand for an industry in the same direction.  Estimating a labor demand 
equation without controlling for these shocks would then result in biased parameter estimates as 
the resulting shocks to labor demand trace out the labor supply curve.  The inclusion of output or 
capital in the conditional labor demand functions is likely to control for at least a part of the 
product demand shocks thereby alleviating biases on this account. 
Second, in order to interpret the estimated coefficients of equation 22 (or its capital based 
analogue) as parameters of the labor demand function we need to assume that the supply of labor 
to each industry-state unit is perfectly elastic so that wages are exogenous.
19  This assumption 
may seem strong given that we do not have firm level data.  However, there are several mitigating 
factors in our application which serve to make this assumption a plausible one.  In the first place, 
our unit of analysis is an industry-state combination where our data pertain to 18 manufacturing 
industries disaggregated by 15 of India’s major states.  This is a much higher level of 
disaggregation in comparison to studies which use either manufacturing wide data or even 
economy-wide industry level data.  In addition, employment in the formal manufacturing sector, 
from which our data comes, is estimated to be less than 10 percent of total non-agricultural 
employment.  This, combined with the pressures of rural-urban migration and the existence of 
                                                 
19  An alternative would be to allow wages to be endogenous and use instruments for these.  In the absence of any 
plausible instruments for wages in our dataset, we tried using lagged wages as instruments but the results were quite 
poor.  In particular, estimated wage elasticities were often positive.  As a result we decided against instrumenting 
wages.   20
considerable open and disguised unemployment in urban areas (Kundu and Gupta, 1996), makes 
it likely that individual state-industry units will face a relatively elastic labor supply.
20    
Third, relegating the industry-state effects, µis, to the error term and estimating labor 
demand functions by OLS is very likely to lead to unsatisfactory estimates.
21  Since lnLit is a 
function of µis, the lagged dependent variable, lnLit-1, will also be a function of µis thereby 
rendering OLS biased and inconsistent.  In addition, unobserved industry-state characteristics 
may well be correlated with one or more of the other regressors.   The usual solution to the 
resulting omitted variable bias plaguing the OLS estimator – employing the within or fixed 
effects estimator – is not a satisfactory solution in our case.  This is because the within 
transformation will introduce a negative correlation of order 1/T between the transformed error 
and the transformed lnLit-1 term (Hsiao, 1986).  For those regressions which involve small T (less 
than 10 in a number of cases we consider below), the resulting bias can be large.  
While the fixed effects estimates can still be informative
22 and we do present results 
obtained from using it, we use the generalized method of moments (GMM) IV estimator of 
Arellano and Bond (1991) in order to obtain consistent and efficient estimates of the labor 
demand equation.  This estimator involves (i) carrying out a first difference (FD) transformation 
of equation 22 (or its capital based analogue) to get rid of the correlation between µis and lnLit-1 
(and other right-hand-side variables); and (ii) using an instrument for the lagged, differenced 
employment term, lnLit-1 – lnLit-2 since it is correlated with the transformed error term, εist -εist-1.  
                                                 
 
20  Indeed, calculations using individual level data from the National Sample Survey data for 1993 suggest that the pool 
of informal sector workers in manufacturing itself is large enough to keep labor supply to a state-industry unit in the 
formal sector fairly flat.  In the Indian context, it is probably fair to assume that the bulk of self-employed workers in 
manufacturing would prefer to work as wage and salaried workers if they could (see, for example, Ghosh, 1999 on this 
point).  In urban areas alone, self-employed workers are 73% of the number of total wage and salaried workers in 
manufacturing.  Since the latter include wage and salaried workers in the formal and informal sectors, the 73% figure is 
probably a lower bound on the ratio of self-employed workers in manufacturing to wage and salaried workers in formal 
manufacturing.   Introducing the rural self-employed in manufacturing into the equation would likely drive the ratio of 
self-employed to wage and salaried workers in formal manufacturing to well over 100%. 
21  Although we are using notation from the output constrained labor demand function of equation 22, the arguments 
apply equally to the capital constrained labor demand function.  
22  Monte Carlo simulations by Judson and Owen (1996) suggest that the bias of the coefficient on right-hand-side 
variables other than the lagged dependent term may be small for the fixed effects estimator.  Since a major part of our 
interest is in these other coefficients, the FE estimates can therefore still be informative.   21
As long as the εist are not serially correlated, a natural choice for an instrument is lnLit-2. 
Additional instruments can be obtained by utilizing the orthogonality conditions existing between 
the further lags of employment and εist.  Estimation is carried out using the one-step GMM 
estimator of Arellano and Bond.  Since instrument validity hinges on the absence of serial 
correlation, a test for second-order serial correlation developed by Arellano and Bond is also 
executed. 
Fourth, since the degree of labor market flexibility may influence adjustment costs, the 
assumption of a common coefficient on the lagged employment term in equation 22 (and its 
capital based analogue) may be overly restrictive.  One way we relax this assumption is to 
estimate labor demand equations separately for flexible and rigid states.  A second way is by 
estimating our labor demand functions using OLS applied to five year differences of the 
underlying data.  By taking differences over a relatively long period, we in effect allow firms to 
have considerable time to adjust to a given shock to their optimal level of employment.  This does 
away with the need for including a lagged employment term as a regressor and therefore 
indirectly relaxes the constraint, implicit in equation 22, that the coefficient on lagged 
employment is same across states.     
Finally, it is important to note that while endogeneity of the right-hand-side variables is 
always a concern in econometric analysis, the usage of year dummies and reliance on estimators 
which control for industry-state specific effects (via a within transformation or time differencing) 
alleviates such concerns.  Consider, in particular,  the potential endogeneity problem due to the 
reverse causation from labor to output in the constant-output labor-demand function, as when 
shocks to technology affect both employment as well as output.  Any such shock which is time 
specific will be captured by our year dummies while shocks which are state specific or industry 
specific as well as those that are specific to any industry in any particular state will be captured by 
the industry-state effects (explicitly introduced or implicitly through time differencing). This, in   22
our opinion, would take care of the bulk of the problem associated with the endogeneity of output 
(and indeed with that of possibly any other right-hand side variable).  Of course, it is still possible 
for there to be some remaining endogeneity between output and employment.  Since finding a 
valid instrument for output is very difficult we carried out the following steps in order to 
determine how serious a  problem the endogeneity of output may be.  If we assume constant 
returns to scale then the coefficient of the log of output in the constant-output  labor demand 
function should be unity. Thus, the log output term can be transferred to the left-hand side with a 
negative sign and so the dependent variable becomes the demand for labor per unit of output. 
When we do this, so that the endogeneity of output is not an issue any more, the results are 
qualitatively extremely similar, thereby telling us that any possible endogeneity not taken care of 
by controlling for time effects and industry-state effects does not bias our results.
23  As for the 
possibility of endogeneity of capital (after controlling for time and industry-state effects), the 
presence of capital market imperfections in a developing country like India suggests that firms 
will find it difficult to adjust capital quickly in response to exogenous shocks that may influence 
employment decisions.  Thus the endogeneity of capital is unlikely to be a significant problem in 
the estimation of the capital constrained labor demand function.  A more serious econometric 
problem associated with capital may be that of measurement error.  In particular, it is unclear how 
accurately available measures of capital, which are based on accounting data, capture the true 
flow of capital services.  As described in our discussion on data below (section 4.2) we tackle this 
problem by adjusting our measure of capital by fuel consumption.  Additionally, we take comfort 
in the fact that the qualitative nature of our results is similar across the three estimators we use: 
the fixed effects estimator, GMM-IV, and OLS applied to five year differences.  Since 
measurement error in the right-hand-side variables will tend to affect the estimates of these three 
                                                 
23  In the context of the fixed effects estimator, constant returns to scale may be imposed by making the additional 
assumption that adjustment costs are zero (i.e., λ = 0).  This assumption is not required if we use the long-difference 
estimator.  Our basic results were unaffected using either estimator. We do not present these results in this paper, as 
constant returns to scale does not seem to be a valid restriction.  In particular, allowing returns to scale to be different 
from one yielded highly significant coefficients of output that are very different from unity (see, for example, columns 
1 and 2 in tables 3 and 4.)     23
estimators to different degrees - Griliches and Hausman (1986)  note that long difference 
estimators (such as our five year difference estimator) tend to be less sensitive to measurement 
error than the fixed effects estimator (which is itself less sensitive to measurement error than the 
first difference estimator) – the invariance of our key results across the different estimators 
suggests to us that measurement error problems may not be particularly serious in our data.  
 
4.2 Data 
The variables required for the estimation of the labor demand equations, equation (22) and its 
capital constrained analogue, are measures of employment, wages, output, capital stocks, factor 
prices other than wages, and indicators for protection and labor market rigidity.  Our source for 
production related information and wages is the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) from 1980 to 
1997.  ASI data covers establishments registered under the Factory Act and employing ten or 
more workers (with power and 20 or more workers without power).  It provides information on 
18 manufacturing industries disaggregated by their location across India’s states.  Among other 
things, the ASI reports for each industry-state combination values of gross output produced, 
intermediate inputs, wage bill, and the book value of capital stocks.  It also reports the number of 
workers.
 24, 25   Since the ASI reports monetary values in current prices, appropriate price deflators 
are needed to convert the nominal values into real ones.   We use industry specific wholesale 
price index (WPI) series to deflate output to constant 1981 rupees.  The WPI for machinery, 
transport equipment and construction is used to deflate the book value of capital stocks.  These 
are further multiplied by real fuel expenditures to control for capacity utilization as in Harrison 
                                                 
24  The ASI derives its measure of workers by dividing “man days worked” by the number of “working days”.  Note, 
however, that our dataset did not contain data on either man days worked or working days for 1997. 
25   The term workers refers to production workers (permanent, contract, and temporary).   The ASI also reports the 
number of “total employees”, i.e., production and non-production workers.  Unfortunately, the ASI uses different 
definitions for reporting payments to workers and “total employees”.  This prevents us from computing a meaningful 
wage rate for non-production workers and analyzing labor demand elasticities for them.    24
(1994).
26  Dividing the total wage bill by the number of workers is used to arrive at wages.
27  An 
overall manufacturing sector materials price deflator and materials price deflators which are 
specific to five broad industry groups are used for measuring the price of material.
28  The user 
cost of capital is constructed by multiplying the deflator for capital goods described above by the 
sum of national money market rates and rate of depreciation (assumed to be 10%).  
  We capture the effects of trade liberalization in two ways.  As described in Section 2.1, 
India embarked on a dramatic program of trade liberalization in 1991.   Thus we use a 
liberalization dummy which takes the value 0 up to 1991 and 1 thereafter to capture the effects of 
a more liberal trading environment on labor markets.   Since this dummy will not capture 
differences in protection across industries and the effects of year to year changes in protection, we 
also use industry and year specific tariff rates.
 29  These tariff rates, presented in Table 1 above, 
are aggregated from tariff rates for 64 industrial product groups, as defined by India’s Central 
Statistical Office, and reported in Pandey (1999) for the years 1988-1997.
30  In order to arrive at 
tariff rates for our 18 two-digit industries, we first mapped each of the 64 industrial products 
groups to one of the 18 industries and then calculated a simple average.   We also computed tariff 
                                                 
26   We also considered a capital measure without adjustment for capacity utilization.  The qualitative results on the 
effects of trade liberalization and labor market flexibility were very similar.  However, the coefficients on the own 
wage term tended to be estimated somewhat imprecisely.  
27   An alternative would be to compute wages by dividing the wage bill by man days worked.  We do not use this 
measure of wages in estimating labor demand equations because (i) man days worked were not available for 1997, the 
last year of our data; and (ii) the results were insensitive to the measure of wages used in estimation based on all other 
years. 
28 The five industry groups represent textiles and textiles products, leather and leather products, metals and metal 
products, chemicals and chemical products, machinery and transport equipment.  It was possible to map 12 of our 18 
industries into these five groups.  For the remaining industries we use the overall manufacturing-wide materials price 
deflator.   All the materials deflators were kindly provided to us by Pushpa Trivedi and their construction is described 
in Trivedi, Prakash, and Sinate (2000). 
29 While tariff rates on inputs would be a conceptually superior measure to use in the context of the output constrained 
labor demand equation, data availability forces us to use the overall industry tariff instead.  This may not be a serious 
deficiency in our application given the degree of industrial aggregation within each of our 18 industries.  Consider the 
transportation equipment industry, for example.  Since this includes the production of both automotive components and 
finished goods, the average tariff rate for this industry will in part be composed of inputs used in this industry.  Thus 
the average tariff rate for this industry would capture the tariffs on both inputs and outputs for the industry.  
30 Pandey (1999) used published tariff rates and aggregated over all the tariff lines corresponding to the 64 industrial 
product groups using a simple average.  Tariff data was missing in Pandey (1999) for two years: 1989 and 1990.  We 
filled these gaps using linear interpolation.  Given the fact that the liberalization program was announced only in mid-
1991, this procedure is unlikely to entail much error.  Indeed, an examination of the tariff rates reported in Pandey 
(1999) for 1988, 1991, and beyond show very little difference in tariff rates between 1988 and 1991.  They drop 
steadily from 1992 onwards, however.  
   25
rates for the 18 industries using 1989 import shares as weights.  The results of our empirical work 
were not sensitive to which of the two we used and so we only report the results based on using 
average tariff rates. 
  We rely upon inter-state variations in labor laws to account for labor market rigidity.  
More specifically we partition states in terms of whether they have flexible labor markets or not.  
A dummy variable created using this partition may then be interacted with wages (and other 
factor prices) to determine the impact of labor market flexibility on labor demand elasticities.  
Our procedure to partition states in terms of the flexibility of their labor markets is as follows.  
We start with Besley and Burgess’ (2002) coding of amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act 
between 1958 and 1992 as pro-employee, anti-employee, or neutral.
31  Five states are found to 
have no amendments in either a pro-employee or anti-employee direction (Assam, Bihar, 
Haryana, Punjab, and UP).  One state, Madhya Pradesh, is found to have a anti-employee 
amendment to the IDA in 1982.  However, this is negated by a pro-employee amendment in 1983 
so that its overall profile with respect to amendments is effectively similar to the five states with 
no amendment activity.  Four states are found to have pro-employee amendments (West Bengal, 
Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Orissa).  Finally, five states are found to have anti-employee 
amendments (Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Rajasthan, and Tamil Nadu).
32    
A natural partition of states would be to treat states with anti-employee amendments to 
the IDA as those with flexible labor markets.
 33  Such a partition has one puzzling feature, 
                                                 
31  Besley and Burgess consider each state-level amendment to the IDA between 1958 and 1992 and code it as a 1, -1, 
or 0 depending on whether the amendment in question is deemed to be pro-employee, anti-employee, or neutral.   The 
scores are then cumulated over time with any multiple amendments for a given year coded to give the general direction 
of change.  See Besley and Burgess (2002) for details.  (The Besley and Burgess coding is available at 
http://econ/lse/ac.uk/staff/rburgess/#wp.) 
32  With the exception of Karnataka these anti-employee amendments took place in 1980 or earlier.  For Karnataka the 
anti-employee amendments take place in 1988. 
33 An alternative measure of labor market flexibility/rigidity would have been to use the cumulative scores on 
amendments.   This is the approach of Besley and Burgess.  We do not use this approach for the following reasons.  
First, an important part of our analysis is based on production and protection related data for the years 1988 to 1997.  
The variation in number of cumulative amendments within states is virtually zero for this period.  Since our estimation 
techniques are based on exploiting variation in the “within” direction, the lack of within state variation in the 
cumulative amendments is obviously a problem if we want to introduce cumulative amendments as an independent 
regressor in our labor demand equations.  Second,  in so far as its interaction with factor price terms is concerned, it is   26
however.  As noted above Maharashtra and Gujarat, two of India’s most industrialized states, 
have passed pro-employee amendments to the IDA.  These states would then be categorized as 
having inflexible labor markets.  However, Indian businesses typically perceive these states to be 
good locations for setting up manufacturing plants.  Conversely, Kerala, a state which has passed 
anti-employee amendments to the IDA, has an industrial record which is patchy in comparison.  
Moreover, few Indian businesses would consider it a prime location for setting up manufacturing 
activity.  It is questionable whether Indian businesses would consider Maharashtra and Gujarat to 
be to be especially good destinations for their capital if their labor markets were very rigid.  We 
therefore consider a modified partition in which Maharashtra and Gujarat are treated as states 
with flexible labor markets while Kerala is treated as a state with inflexible labor markets. 
A recent research project carried out by the World Bank on the investment climate faced 
by manufacturing firms across ten Indian states lends strong support to such a switch (see Dollar, 
Iarossi,  and Mengistae, 2002 and World Bank, 2003).
34   First, averages of rankings by managers 
of surveyed firms led Maharashtra and Gujarat to be the two states categorized as “Best 
Investment Climate” states while Kerala was one of the three “Poor Investment Climate” states.  
Indeed, a second finding of the World Bank project seems to suggest that even if IDA 
amendments have been pro-employee in these two states, their enforcement may have been weak.  
In particular, the study reports that small and medium sized enterprises receive twice as many 
factory inspections a year in poor climate states (of which Kerala is a member) as in the two best 
climate states of Maharashtra and Gujarat.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a question on 
firms’ perceptions about “over-manning” – i.e., how the optimal level of employment would 
differ from current employment given the current level of output – indicated that while over-
                                                                                                                                                 
not clear to what extent a cardinal measure such as the number of cumulative amendments captures the actual 
difference in labor market rigidity across states. 
34   Over a thousand firms were surveyed across ten states.  Over nine-hundred were manufacturing firms spanning 
major products of the manufacturing sector (garments, textiles, auto components, drugs and pharmaceuticals, electrical 
goods, and machine tools).   27
manning was present in all states, it was lowest on average in Maharashtra and Gujarat.
35  We 
therefore rely on our modified list of states which have flexible labor regulations or not.  
However, we do point out below how our results change if we were to use the list which emerges 
if we restrict ourselves to only the Besley and Burgess based measure.
36  Table 2 provides a list of 
the states as well as how they are classified according to different criteria.  
 
5.  Empirical analysis 
5.1  Trade liberalization, labor regulations, and labor demand elasticities 
As described in Section 3, a more liberal trade policy may be expected to raise the labor demand 
elasticity by increasing substitution possibilities among factor inputs and making product demand 
more elastic.  More liberal regulation of labor markets, or weaker enforcement of existing 
regulations, can have similar effects.  Thus less stringent job security laws or poor enforcement of 
these laws may allow labor to be more easily substituted for other factors.  They may also lead to 
reductions in the adjustment costs associated with labor.  We now examine the evidence for these 
possibilities.   
 
5.1a  Constant output labor demand elasticity 
We begin by considering fixed effects (FE) estimates of the constant output labor demand 
function.  Although the presence of the lagged dependent variable introduces a bias in the FE 
estimates, as pointed out in Section 4.1 above Monte Carlo simulations by Judson and Owen 
(1996) suggest that the bias of the coefficient on RHS variables other than the lagged dependent 
                                                 
35  A supplement to the original World Bank survey carried out in two good investment climate states and one poor 
investment climate state was aimed at determining the reasons behind over-manning.  The results indicated that over-
manning was partially the result of labor hoarding in anticipation of higher growth in the future in the good investment 
climate states but hardly so in the poor investment climate state.  In fact, labor regulations were noted as a major reason 
for over-manning in the latter.  This lends indirect support to the notion that given Maharashtra and Gujarat’s ranking 
as best investment climate states, labor regulations have in effect been less binding on firms than the amendments to the 
IDA may suggest.   
 
36  See footnotes 45 and 48.   28
term may be small.  Since a major part of our interest is in these other coefficients, FE estimates 
can therefore still be informative.   
The first four columns of Table 3 pertain to specifications in which the lagged 
employment term is omitted while the last four include this.  To conserve space, we present 
estimates of only the parameters of interest.
37  The results are fairly similar across both types of 
specifications.  The negative and significant estimates of the interaction term involving wages and 
the post-1991 dummy in columns 1 and 5 reveal that labor demand elasticities were significantly 
higher (in absolute terms) in the years following 1991.  Examining the interaction term involving 
wages and our dummy for flexible labor markets reveals that they were also higher in states with 
more flexible labor markets.  Switching from a dummy indicator for trade liberalization to the 
more direct, industry specific trade policy based measure in columns 2 and 6 preserves the result 
that trade liberalization has made labor demand more elastic: lower tariff rates are associated with 
a more elastic labor demand curve.  Additionally, labor demand elasticities continue to be higher 
in flexible labor markets as in columns 1 and 5.    
To get a sense of the magnitudes involved consider a 110 percentage point decline in 
average tariffs (average tariff rates in 1988 were around 150% and fell to around 40% by 1997).  
In terms of the estimates of column 6, this would take the long-run labor demand elasticity from -
0.11 to  -0.20 in a state with inflexible labor markets and from    -0.33 to -0.42 in a state with 
flexible labor markets.
38   
How sensitive are these results are to the pooling of data from 18 different industries such 
that the parameters of the labor demand equation are constrained to be equal across these 
                                                 
37  The variables which are estimated but omitted from the tables include year dummies and all non-wage factor prices 
and their interactions.  Additionally, since all the econometric models we employ exploit variation in the “within” 
dimension, we cannot include an own term for labor market flexibility since this only varies by state.  We also cannot 
include own terms for the post-1991 dummy in estimating our labor demand equations given that we use year 
dummies.  Finally, since the user cost of capital varies only by year, it is not possible to include it and its interaction 
with the post-1991 dummy. 
38 Long run elasticities are obtained for columns 5-8 by dividing the individual short run elasticities by 1-λ. It may be 
noted that these estimated elasticities, although on the low side in the case of the states with inflexible labor markets, 
are well within the range of estimates reported by Hamermesh (1993; pages 95-96).   29
industries?  To address this issue we re-estimate all the specifications described so far by 
allowing the coefficients of the own factor price and output terms to vary by industry.  Our basic 
results insofar as the effects of trade liberalization and labor market flexibility on labor elasticity 
are concerned do not change.  Examination of the various interaction terms involving wages in 
columns 3,4, 7, and 8 reveals that the estimated parameters and the levels of significance are 
similar to the corresponding estimates based on one set of parameter estimates for all industries.
39  
  Though informative, the FE estimates do suffer from the fact that they do not take into 
account the endogeneity of the lagged employment term.  We therefore turn to now to two sets of 
estimates which deal with this problem in different ways.  Table 4 presents the relevant 
parameters of constant output labor demand equation estimated from OLS applied to data 
differenced by five years.  As noted earlier, such long differencing is likely to alleviate biases in 
the fixed effects estimator since by considering differences over long periods of time, it allows for 
adjustments to be made in response to shocks to firms’ optimal levels of employment.  On the 
whole, results are qualitatively very similar to those obtained from the FE model.   Thus, labor 
demand elasticity is found to increase in the post 1991 period (column 1) and with reductions in 
tariff rates (column 2).  It also increases with flexibility of labor markets (columns 1 and 2).   
With the exception of the interaction term involving wages and labor market flexibility in column 
2 all the relevant interaction terms are statistically significant at conventional levels.  Allowing 
for the coefficients of own factor price terms and output to vary by industry, however, makes 
even this interaction term significant once again.
40 
In the next two columns, we focus on the tariff based measure of liberalization and 
estimate the labor demand function separately for states with inflexible labor regulations (column 
                                                 
39  While the range of estimates for the eighteen industry specific wage terms is rather large (-1.46 to 0.73) and includes 
some positive values, a majority of the terms are negatively signed in each of the four models (and in fact in all the rest 
of the models estimated in this paper).  The mean, median, and standard deviations of industry specific wage terms for 
each of the four models are: -.09, -0.09, 0.42 (column 3); -0.30, -0.21, 0.52 (column 4); -.05, -0.07, 0.36 (column 7); 
and –0.27, -0.20, 0.49 (column 8). 
40   The mean, median, and standard deviations of industry specific wage terms are:  -.10, -0.06, 0.40 (column 3); and -
0.28, -0.17, 0.56 (column 4).   30
5) and flexible labor regulations (column 6).
41  A comparison of parameter estimates across the 
two samples tells an interesting story.  First, states with flexible labor markets have an own wage 
term which is twice as large in absolute terms as that in states with inflexible labor markets.  
Second, the interaction term between wages and tariff rates is far larger in states with flexible 
labor markets.  The implications are that a lowering of tariff rates generates a stronger response in 
labor demand elasticities in states with flexible labor markets. 
Table 5 describes the estimates of key parameters based on the GMM-IV estimator, the 
second way we deal with the endogeneity of the lagged employment term.  The estimates on the 
lagged employment term are fairly low and  in most cases estimated rather imprecisely.  The only 
significant estimate of the lagged employment term is that of column 1.  The implied half life of 
the adjustment process – i.e. the length of time it takes to move halfway to a new equilibrium in 
response to a shock – works out to be roughly one-third of a year (0.30 years).
42  In view of the 
arguments of critics of India’s labor laws, such a value is surprising.   At the same time it is 
possible that adjustment of employment is in fact less costly than the critics claim with the usage 
of temporary workers and violation of laws diluting their impact. 
Although a number of the wage terms are not estimated very precisely - the own wage 
term in column 1 is insignificant while that in column 2 is only marginally significant (15.5% 
level), for example - the overall flavor of the results is as before.   Thus the interaction terms 
involving wages and the labor flexibility dummy indicate that labor demand has been more elastic 
in states with flexible labor markets (columns 1-4).   The results for trade liberalization are also as 
before, with the relevant parameters estimated fairly precisely.   Thus the interaction term 
involving wages and the post-1991 dummy is negative and significantly so in both column 1 and 
column 3 where the parameters of the labor demand function are allowed to vary across the 18 
industries.   Switching to the tariff based measure of  trade liberalization, we find that the 
                                                 
41   Results are similar if we use the post-1991 dummy instead.  To conserve space we do not report these.  
42  The half life (t*) may be computed as the solution to λ
t*=0.5.     31
interaction term between  wages and tariff rates is positive as before although it fails to be 
significant at conventional levels (column 2).  The effect is, however, significant when we allow 
for industrial heterogeneity in the labor demand function (column 4).
43   
As in Table 4, not only do states with flexible labor markets have higher labor demand 
elasticities, the elasticities themselves are more responsive to trade liberalization.  In states with 
inflexible labor markets, for example, a reduction in average tariff rates from 150%, the average 
in 1988, to 40%, the average in 1997, is associated with an increase in the long-run elasticity of 
labor demand from -0.14 to -0.20.  Both estimates fail to be statistically significant, however.
 44   
In contrast, the corresponding change in tariffs for states with flexible labor markets is an increase 




5.1b  Capital constrained labor demand elasticity 
We now turn to the capital constrained labor demand function to examine the relationship 
between trade liberalization, labor regulations and labor demand elasticities.  As noted in Section 
3, trade liberalization may be expected to affect labor demand elasticities by increasing 
substitution possibilities in production and by making product demand more elastic.  While the 
constant output labor demand elasticities discussed above are affected only by the former 
channel, constant capital elasticities will tend to pick up the effects of both.  In addition, 
examining how the constant capital labor demand elasticities behave in response to tariff changes 
is useful since there may be some concern that we have not used a tariff rate which applies solely 
                                                 
43  The mean, median, and standard deviations of industry specific wage terms are:  -.07, -0.09, 0.38 (column 3); and -
0.31, -0.30, 0.55 (column 4). 
 
44   Due to the non-linear nature of the long run elasticities, statistical inference is based on the delta method. 
45   The result that labor demand elasticities are more responsive to reductions in protection in states with more flexible 
labor markets is sensitive to the classification system we use to categorize states.  In particular,  if we classify 
Maharashtra and Gujarat as states with inflexible labor markets and Kerala as one with flexible labor markets – as 
would be the case if we were to use exactly Besley and Burgess’ coding scheme -  we get insignificant estimates on the 
interaction term between wages and tariff rates for both sets of states.     32
to inputs in previous sections.  Thus examining the relationship between tariff rate changes and 
labor demand elasticities derived from the capital constrained model provides a useful robustness 
check on our results so far. 
  Tables 6 and 7 present the estimates from the Fixed Effects estimator and OLS applied to 
five year differences, respectively.  Since the results are fairly similar to those obtained from the 
GMM-IV estimator, we proceed directly to a discussion of the these. Table 7 presents various 
estimates of the relevant parameters using the GMM-IV  estimator.  In contrast to the results 
reported in Table 5 for the output constrained labor demand function, the coefficient on lagged 
employment tends to be precisely estimated across the various models.
46    In addition, the 
estimates of the own wage term are significant at the ten percent level or lower in all but one of 
the models considered.   Trade liberalization –whether captured via the post-1991 dummies or in 
terms of reductions in tariff rates - is found to lead to higher labor demand elasticities (columns 1 
and 2).  This remains the case even when own factor prices and the capital term are allowed to 
vary by industry (columns 3 and 4).
47   Labor market flexibility also tends to raise labor demand 
elasticity, although the effect is not estimated very precisely.    
Splitting the overall sample into two sub-samples on the basis of labor market flexibility 
confirms the results of Section 5.1a that states with flexible labor markets not only have more 
elastic labor demand curves to begin with, the elasticity of demand increases with trade 
liberalization (column 5 versus column 6).   Thus in terms of the decline in average tariff rates 
from 150% in 1988 to 40% in 1997, the long-run elasticity of labor demand increased from -0.18 
to  -0.34 (with the latter being statistically significantly different from zero) in states with 
inflexible labor markets.  The corresponding increase in states with flexible labor markets was -
0.28 to -0.52 (with the both point estimates being statistically significantly different from zero).
48    
                                                 
46 However, the implied half-life of the adjustment process is still around 1/3
rd of a year. 
47  It may be noted, however, that allowing for industry level heterogeneity in the labor demand equation leads to a 
rejection of the null that second order serial correlation in the differenced errors is absent. 
48 As with the output constrained labor demand function, re-classifying Maharashtra and Gujarat as states with 
inflexible labor markets and Kerala as one with flexible labor markets makes the estimated coefficient on the   33
It is interesting to note that these elasticities are at least as large as those estimated using 
the output constrained labor demand function.  Thus while the elasticities here capture the 
substitution possibilities between labor and materials only, they often more than make up for the 
omission of substitution possibilities between labor and capital by incorporating the effects of  
more elastic product demand.    
Additionally, the increase in labor demand elasticity associated with tariff reductions is 
robust to the inclusion of an additional interaction term involving wages and the post-1991 
dummy in the case of states with flexible labor markets.  Although the estimated model is not 
shown, the implied long-run elasticity of labor demand is found to increase from -0.28 to -0.52 in 
response to a tariff reduction from 150% to 40%.  What is important to note is that this increase is 
driven by the positive and significant estimate on the interaction term involving wages and tariff 
rates and not the interaction term involving wages and the post 1991 dummy which turns out to 
be positive but insignificant.  The significance of this is that it suggests that the increase in 
elasticity associated with tariff reductions is not being driven by non-trade related phenomena 
that may have been accompanied with trade liberalization and also made labor demand more 
elastic.  In particular, trade liberalization in India has been accompanied by a dramatic 
deregulation of industrial policy that has curtailed the power of the bureaucracy in the post-1991 
period.  If the latter is responsible for a more elastic labor demand – for example, because of a 
weakening of the governments’ enforcement machinery – then we would expect the interaction 
between wages and tariff rates to lose explanatory power in the presence of the interaction 
between wages and the post-1991 dummy.  The fact that this does not happen suggests that tariff 
reductions have been an independent force driving labor demand elasticities to increase.  
5.2 Volatility in wages and employment 
                                                                                                                                                 
interaction term involving wages and tariff rates roughly similar (and insignificant) across both types of states.  Since a 
finding of differential effects of trade reforms on labor demand elasticities across flexible and inflexible labor markets 
is an intuitively appealing one, we consider the contrasting results as further support of our categorization of 
Maharashtra and Gujarat as having flexible labor markets and Kerala as having inflexible labor markets.  
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Based on equations (19), (20) and (21) and on our pre- and post-reform estimates of labor 
demand elasticities 
D η , we simulate the values of   t t t t A d L d A d w d ln ln   and ln ln
* *  for a range 
of alternative values of 
S η  (Table 9). The first set of labor-demand elasticity estimates (pre-
reform value of 0.26 and the post-reform value of 0.30) we use are from our capital-constrained, 
fixed-effects model without adjustment costs, while the second set of elasticity estimates (pre-
reform value of 0.19 and the post-reform value of 0.35) are for the  “actual” capital-constrained 
labor demand  estimated using the GMM-IV approach. All the estimates used are for the flexible-
labor states since these would represent an upper bound on the adverse volatility effects of an 
increase in the labor-demand elasticity. We also discuss the consequences of looking at the 
implied estimates of the “ideal” labor demand obtained from the second set of elasticity estimates 
and the estimated value of the parameter λ (which is small, implying a short adjustment lag). 
  We see from table 9 that when an entire industry in a state takes the wage as given 
( ∞ =
S η ), changes in productivity (or alternatively output demand conditions) do not lead to 
changes in the wage, while the percentage change in employment due to a one percent change in 
At exactly equals the labor-demand elasticity. To the extent that the labor demand function we 
estimated turns out to be fairly inelastic, workers are quite insulated from shocks to labor 
demand. However, employment volatility (and its change) in response to a given productivity 
volatility (and its change) does increase after the reform by roughly 15% with the first set of 
elasticities and by more than 80% with the second set when the labor supply is assumed to be 
absolutely flat.  
For the polar opposite case of a vertical labor supply curve, there is no effect of a change 
in At on employment but the percentage change in wage exactly equals the percentage change in 
At. However, there is no change in the two derivates due to the reforms.  
With a unitary elastic labor supply curve, the response of wage and employment to a 
change in At are the same and under the first set of demand elasticity estimates, a one percent   35
change in At gives rise to a  0.21 percent change in  wage and employment (which means a 0.42 
percent change in the wage bill of the industry) prior to the reforms and 0.23 percent change (0.46 
percent for the wage bill) after the reforms. This, in turn, means that the transmission of volatility 
increases by less than 10% for the wage, employment and the wage bill. Under the second set of 
demand elasticity estimates, this increase in volatility transmission is roughly 62%.  
If we assume a much flatter demand (
S η = 10) which is less than perfectly elastic, these 
changes are approximately 16% and 80% for the two sets of estimated demand elasticities 
respectively.   
We need to point out here that the implied pre-reform and post reform labor-demand 
elasticities that come out of the second set of estimates (which are “actual” labor demand 
elasticities) and an estimate of λ between 0.14 and 0.15 are 0.22 and 0.41 respectively, which can 
lead to a change in volatility transmission of up to 90 percent. 
Thus, our elasticity estimates indicate that the transmission of productivity and output 
demand volatility into the labor market may have gone up significantly following the reforms. 
However, our derivatives also imply that the transmission of productivity growth (in times of 
sustained growth) also should have gone up significantly, thus implying that the reforms may 
have moved workers into an environment that can provide them with higher returns but also 
which is one that is associated with greater risks. The growth aspect is not straight forward and is 
certainly beyond the scope of this paper and so we will focus only on volatility in empirical 
results. 
We now turn to table 10 where we present our empirical results on volatility. Here, we 
compare the volatility of variables in the post-reform period with the their volatility in the 
perform period. Here, we break our 18 years of data into three sub-sets: 1980-85, 1986-91 and 
1992-97.
49 The last period is the post-reform period. For each period, a volatility index for 
                                                 
49 When wages and employment are defined in terms of man days, the three sub-sets are: 1980-85, 1986-91 and 1991-
96 due to the lack of availability of data on man days for the year 1997.    36
employment, wage rate, total factor productivity (TFP) and output is constructed for each state 
and industry combination.
50 We define the index of volatility of a variable as just the residual of 
the regression of the standard deviation of the logarithm of a variable for a given period on the 
average growth rate of the variable in the same period, thereby eliminating any growth 
component.
51 
On table 10, Vol(.) stands for the volatility of the variable under consideration, work 
stands for labor, w for wage, rw for real wage and out for output. The additional “md” at the end 
of some of the variables represents that the respective variables were calculated by defining labor 
in terms of man days as opposed to just the number of workers. “Post 91” is just a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 after the year 1991 and is zero otherwise and “tariff” stands for the 
tariff rate in the third year of  each period (six-year sub-set).
52 
We first see that the volatility of both work and wages, however defined, is positively 
related to the volatility of TFP and of output throughout. We find that in the pre-reform period the 
transmission of the volatility of TFP and of output was much higher into employment than into 
wages, which may suggest a fairly flat labor supply curve.
53  We find a positive sign on the 
productivity volatility interacted with post 91 dummy for the nominal wage per worker and the 
nominal and real wage per worker day. The transmission of volatility into employment did not 
seem to change after the reform. While these findings are consistent with the theory to the extent 
that labor market variables have become more volatile in response to a given TFP volatility, the 
fact that the transmission into wage volatility increased in the absence of any change in the 
transmission into employment volatility especially in the presence of a much higher initial 
                                                 
50 We calculated the TFP for each state-industry combination for each year by fitting a Cobb-Douglas production 
function in capital, labor and materials with time, state and industry fixed effects. The TFP then was defined as the 
residual of this regression plus these fixed effects. 
 
51 In order to run this regression, we pooled all industries in all states overall all consecutive six-year sets in our dataset.  
52 When we use tariff in place of post 91, only the last two six year subsets of years are used due to the fact that tariff is 
available only from 1988 onwards. 
53  The transmission of the volatility of output continues to be much higher into employment than into wages even after 
1991.    37
transmission into employment volatility is somewhat at odds with the theory. However, overall 
we find that in both the pre- and post-reform periods, the transmission of TFP volatility into 
employment was substantially higher than into employment, indicating the existence of a fairly 
flat labor supply curve. 
The results are qualitatively similar when we interact the productivity volatility with tariff 
instead.  The wage and employment volatility are increasing in TFP volatility and negatively 
related to its interaction with tariff (for the cases for which we have statistical significance), 
which given the lower tariff in the post reform period is the correct sign. In order to get a sense of 
the transmission prior to and after the reforms, it should be taken into account that the average 
tariff in the pre-reform period was roughly 150% and that in the post-reform period was 50%, 
which again shows that the response of employment  volatility to TFP volatility was generally 
higher than that of  wage volatility. 
We then look at the effect of output volatility as we know employment at any given 
vector of factor prices is positively related to output and changes in output certainly capture to a 
large extent changes in demand as well as TFP. Again, we find that the responsiveness of work 
volatility to output volatility is generally much stronger than the response of wage volatility. 
Moreover, the interaction of output volatility with the post 91 dummy is positive and significant 
only for employment in terms of the number of workers. In all other cases, it is insignificant. 
Thus, the third set of regressions is completely consistent with the theory and with a fairly elastic 
labor supply curve. 
In the fourth set of regressions, our priors regarding a fairly flat labor supply are 
vindicated again and this time very strongly so. The output volatility variable is positive and 
significant in four of the six columns and the ones for employment are significantly higher than 
for the wages. The interaction between tariff and output volatility has the correct sign and is 
significant for employment and has the wrong sign and is significant for rw.    38
Thus we conclude that the transmission of volatility into the labor market from 
productivity and output demand did go up following the reforms. Also, this was decreasing in 
protection across sectors and over time.  
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have rigorously looked at how major trade reforms initiated in India in 1991 
affected the industry-level elasticity of labor demand in the manufacturing sector. Our data are 
disaggregated by state and industry and are for the period 1980-97. Given that we have variation 
across industries and over time in protection levels and variation across states in labor-market 
institutions, we believe ours is the first paper that is able to decompose the effect of protection 
and labor regulations on these elasticities and at the same time look at the interaction between the 
two.   
Our results indicate that labor demand elasticities increase with reductions in protection.  
Unlike Slaughter (2001), we do not find time, independent of protection, to dominate our results.  
Protection thus appears to have the effects that theory would predict.  We also find that the 
response of labor demand elasticities to protection is conditioned by the nature of labor 
institutions: states with more flexible labor markets see larger increases in labor demand 
elasticities in response to reductions in protection.   This is consistent with a point increasingly 
emphasized in the growth and development literature – that the effect of economy wide policies 
such as trade policy depends in important ways on the institutional context (see, for example, 
Rodrik, Subramanium, and Trebbi, 2002).   
These findings have important implications for public policy and highlight some 
challenges for policy-making.  First, as is theoretically possible given the increases in labor 
demand elasticities we find that after the reforms, productivity and output volatility have resulted 
in larger wage and employment volatility.     39
Second, although our results also suggest that tighter labor regulations- through 
restrictions on retrenchments and layoffs, for example -  can dampen this volatility, it is hard to 
believe that more widespread use of such regulations is the desirable policy response.  
Particularly in the context of India’s growing integration with the international economy, 
allowing Indian firms to be exposed to import competition but constraining their ability to adjust 
their inputs in response is likely to put domestic firms at a serious disadvantage in terms of their 
ability to compete.
54   
Finally, the negative consequences of trade on worker welfare uncovered in this paper 
need to be assessed against its positive effects.  Krishna and Mitra (1998) and Hasan (2002), 
based on analysis of distinct firm level panel data sets from India, find evidence that trade can 
contribute to productivity.
55  To the extent that a more elastic labor demand will translate this 
growth into higher growth in wages and employment, workers have benefited from these reforms. 
Krishna and Mitra also find a massive reduction in mark-ups across all sectors, thereby implying 
a significant destruction of monopolies and the associated dead-weight losses and at the same 
time leading to the transformation of large amounts of producer surpluses into consumer 
surpluses. Also, the greater ease of substitution between factor inputs that we observe after the 
reforms probably leads to a more efficient allocation of resources. 
In view of the opposing effects that trade can have on workers, what does seem clear is 
that developing effective institutions that protect the welfare of workers adversely affected by 
trade without impinging on firms’ abilities to adjust to changing conditions is a key challenge for 
public policy. 
 
                                                 
54  Indeed, this is one of the arguments used by reform-minded policymakers dissatisfied with Indian labor regulations.  
See in particular the recent report on employment related issues commissioned by the Planning Commission, 
Government of India (2001). 
55  Krishna and Mitra (1998) find that productivity growth increased after trade reforms in many of the manufacturing 
industries they examine while Hasan (2002) finds that imported technology can be an important source of productivity 
growth for manufacturing sector firms.    40
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Table 1.   Average tariff rates by industry 
       Percent  Change 
 1988  1992  1997  1988-92  1988-97 
Food 171.96  103.66  35.96  -39.72  -79.09 
Beverages 150.00  138.52  59.85  -7.66  -60.10 
Cotton textiles  124.55  103.64  41.14  -16.79  -66.97 
Wool, etc  151.99  96.45  33.84  -36.54  -77.74 
Jute textiles  140.00  108.75  45.00  -22.32  -67.86 
Textile products  140.93  101.96  46.35  -27.65  -67.11 
Wood 135.30  108.16  45.00  -20.06  -66.74 
Paper 159.79  90.13  34.65  -43.59  -78.32 
Leather 145.00  109.38  38.54  -24.57  -73.42 
Chemicals 201.56  108.20  35.32  -46.32  -82.48 
Rubber 141.23  103.09  38.09  -27.00  -73.03 
Cement, etc  145.61  109.15  42.17  -25.04  -71.04 
Basic metals  212.17  106.32  32.49  -49.89  -84.69 
Metal products  162.15  108.40  35.19  -33.15  -78.30 
Machinery 139.51  107.54  29.39  -22.91  -78.93 
Electrical machinery  143.17  107.84  37.34  -24.68  -73.92 
Transport equipment    129.96  102.46  39.27  -21.16  -69.78 
Other manufacturing     149.05  107.93  39.33  -27.59  -73.61 
 
   ii
 
Table 2.   Labor market flexibility across states 
State Besley-Burgess  (2002)  based 
measure 
Investment climate 
(World Bank, 2003) 
Composite measure 
Andhra Pradesh  Flexible  Good  Flexible 
Assam In-flexible  --  In-flexible 
Bihar In-flexible  --  In-flexible 
Gujarat In-flexible  Best    Flexible 
Haryana In-flexible  --  In-flexible 
Karnataka Flexible Good  Flexible 
Kerala Flexible  Poor  In-Flexible 
Madhya Pradesh  In-flexible  --  In-flexible 
Maharashtra In-flexible  Best  Flexible 
Orissa In-flexible  --  In-flexible 
Punjab In-flexible  Medium  In-flexible 
Rajasthan Flexible  --  Flexible 
Tamil Nadu  Flexible  Good  Flexible 
Uttar Pradesh  In-flexible  Poor  In-flexible 
West Bengal  In-flexible  Poor  In-flexible 
   iii
 
Table 3.  Output constrained labor demand (With industry-state fixed effects) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 


























Lag  ln(emp)         0.233 0.157 0.168 0.109 
         (20.35)***  (9.89)***  (15.03)***  (7.21)*** 
Ln(wage)  -0.063 -0.212     -0.029 -0.199    
  (2.64)*** (5.79)***     (1.26)  (5.55)***    
Ln(wage)*post91  -0.159   -0.115    -0.125   -0.087  
  (9.24)***   (5.86)***    (7.55)***   (4.49)***  
Ln(wage)*tariffs   0.001    0.001   0.001   0.001 
   (4.03)***    (4.01)***   (3.57)***   (3.53)*** 
Ln(wage)*flex -0.236  -0.180  -0.171  -0.125  -0.187 -0.186 -0.155 -0.133 
  (5.36)*** (2.61)*** (4.03)***  (1.95)*  (4.26)*** (2.74)*** (3.57)*** (2.11)** 
Tariffs  -0.002    -0.005   -0.002   -0.004 
   (0.95)    (1.39)   (0.74)   (1.24) 
Ln(output)  0.589 0.556     0.500 0.528    
  (70.84)*** (42.91)***     (54.61)*** (40.65)***    




246 246 246  246  246 246 246 246 
R-squared  0.63 0.52 0.72  0.66  0.66 0.54 0.73 0.67 
Notes.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) 
significant at 1% level. Variables included in estimation but not reported include: non-wage factor prices (and their 
interactions with trade policy and flexibility variables) and year dummies.   iv
Table 4.  Output constrained labor demand (Five year differences) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
 Post-1991 
dummy 











Ln(wage)  -0.057 -0.226     -0.206 -0.416 
  (2.05)**  (4.65)***    (3.60)***  (5.01)*** 
Ln(wage)*post91  -0.136   -0.084      
  (6.57)***   (3.87)***      
Ln(wage)*tariffs    0.001   0.001  0.000 0.002 
   (3.32)***    (2.85)***  (1.12)  (4.50)*** 
Ln(wage)*flex  -0.236 -0.130 -0.187  -0.186     
 (4.67)***  (1.35)  (3.87)***  (2.11)**     
Tariffs    -0.005   -0.012  -0.003 -0.007 
    (1.29)   (2.00)**  (0.49) (1.67)* 
Ln(output)  0.561 0.561     0.587 0.499 
  (56.08)*** (31.33)***     (24.91)*** (18.11)*** 
Observations  3198 1230 3198  1230  715  515 
R-squared  0.56 0.52 0.67  0.68  0.52 0.55 
Notes.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) 
significant at 1% level.  Variables included in estimation in terms of five year differences but not reported include: 
non-wage factor prices (and their interactions with trade policy and flexibility variables) and year dummies. 
 
   v
Table 5.  Output constrained labor demand (GMM-IV) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Post-1991 
dummy 











Lag  ln(emp)  0.101  0.088 0.022 0.066  0.088 0.130 
  (2.03)**  (1.04) (0.62) (1.32)  (0.97) (1.29) 
Ln(wage) -0.062  -0.237      -0.209  -0.539 
 (0.57)  (1.42)      (1.15)  (3.45)*** 
Ln(wage)*post91 -0.161    -0.150       
 (2.59)***    (2.67)***       
Ln(wage)*tariffs   0.001    0.001  0.001  0.002 
   (1.35)    (1.97)**  (0.50)  (3.81)*** 
Ln(wage)*flex -0.226  -0.302  -0.117  -0.195     
 (1.44)  (1.60)  (0.98)  (1.42)     
Tariffs   0.001    -0.006  0.001  -0.001 
   (0.32)    (1.82)*  (0.13)  (0.45) 
Ln(output) 0.617  0.577      0.624  0.425 
 (13.36)***  (9.59)***      (8.62)***  (5.82)*** 
Observations  3936  2214 3936 2214  1287 927 
Number of industry-state 
units 
246  246 246 246  143 103 
s-corr 2
# 0.87  0.13  -0.77  -0.69  0.48  -1.24 
Notes.  Absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; 
(***) significant at 1% level.  (
#) Test statistic for second order serial correlation. Variables included in estimation in 
terms of first differences but not reported include: non-wage factor prices (and their interactions with trade policy 
and flexibility variables) and year dummies.   vi
Table 6.  Capital constrained labor demand (With industry-state fixed effects) 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 


























Lag  ln(emp)          0.294 0.216 0.239 0.184 
          (26.13)*** (13.94)*** (21.26)*** (12.24)*** 
Ln(wage)  -0.118 -0.116      -0.093 -0.114     
 (4.71)***  (3.17)***      (3.90)***  (3.23)***     
Ln(wage)*post91  -0.041   -0.103    -0.018  -0.060  
 (2.28)**    (5.03)***    (1.06)    (3.06)***   
Ln(wage)*tariffs   0.000    0.001   -0.000  0.000 
   (0.23)    (2.57)**   (0.37)   (1.74)* 
Ln(wage)*flex -0.144 -0.199  -0.131  -0.169  -0.125 -0.202 -0.102 -0.168 
 (3.13)***  (2.84)***  (2.94)***  (2.54)**  (2.81)***  (3.00)***  (2.30)**  (2.61)*** 
Tariffs   0.001    0.001   0.002  0.002 
   (0.75)    (0.73)   (1.21)  (1.13) 
Ln(capital)  0.263 0.246      0.219 0.236     
  (64.68)*** (41.56)***      (52.46)*** (41.24)***     




246 246  246  246  246 246 246 246 
R-squared  0.59 0.51  0.68  0.63  0.64 0.55 0.71 0.65 
Notes.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) 
significant at 1% level. Variables included in estimation but not reported include: material prices (and its 
interactions with trade policy and flexibility variables) and year dummies.       vii
Table 7.  Capital constrained labor demand (Five year differences) 

















Ln(wage) -0.072  -0.126      -0.102  -0.312 
 (2.44)**  (2.57)**      (1.78)*  (3.60)*** 
Ln(wage)*post91 -0.050    -0.064       
 (2.33)**    (2.77)***       
Ln(wage)*tariffs   -0.000    0.000  -0.000  0.001 
   (0.08)    (1.25)  (1.27)  (2.23)** 
Ln(wage)*flex -0.183  -0.113  -0.155  -0.133    
 (3.48)***  (1.16)  (3.02)***  (1.45)     
Tariffs   0.001    0.002  0.000  0.001 
   (0.45)    (0.77)  (0.10)  (0.49) 
Ln(capital) 0.239  0.241      0.253 0.214 
 (50.92)***  (29.54)***      (24.06)***  (15.82)*** 
            
            
Observations 3198  1230  3198  1230 715  515 
R-squared 0.52  0.50  0.61  0.64  0.50 0.50 
Notes.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) 
significant at 1% level.  Variables included in estimation in terms of five year differences but not reported include: 
material prices (and its interactions with trade policy and flexibility variables) and year dummies.      viii
Table 8.  Capital constrained labor demand (GMM-IV) 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Post-1991 
dummy 











Lag  ln(emp)  0.144  0.144 0.079 0.144 0.150 0.135 
  (2.99)***  (1.94)* (2.14)**  (3.12)***  (1.93)* (1.30) 
Ln(wage)  -0.101  -0.324    -0.338  -0.520 
  (1.01)  (2.24)**    (2.30)**  (3.83)*** 
Ln(wage)*post91  -0.164   -0.161     
  (3.38)***   (3.05)***     
Ln(wage)*tariffs    0.001   0.001 0.001 0.002 
    (2.16)**   (2.30)** (1.41)  (3.44)*** 
Ln(wage)*flex  -0.190  -0.284 -0.151 -0.238    
  (1.43)  (1.58) (1.40) (1.83)*     
Tariffs    0.001    -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
    (0.55)   (0.59) (0.27) (0.87) 
Ln(capital)  0.279  0.272    0.292  0.197 
  (12.96)***  (9.42)***    (8.61)***  (7.30)*** 
Observations  3936  2214 3936 2214 1287 927 
Number of industry-state 
units 
246  246 246 246 143 103 
s-corr 2
#  1.89  0.23 0.68 -1.68  0.35 -0.29 
Notes.  Absolute value of robust z statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; 
(***) significant at 1% level.  (
#) Test statistic for second order serial correlation. Variables included in estimation in 
terms of first differences but not reported include: material prices (and its interactions with trade policy and 
flexibility variables) and year dummies.   ix
Table 9: Simulated variation in equilibrium wages and employment in response to estimated changes in 
labor-demand elasticity   
   S η     S η  
   ∞  10 1 0    ∞  10 1 0 
Pre-reform 
26 . 0 =
D η  
0 0.025 0.21  1  Pre-reform 
19 . 0 =
D η  










30 . 0 =
D η  
0 0.029 0.23  1  Post-reform 
35 . 0 =
D η  
0 0.034  0.26 1 
Pre-reform 
26 . 0 =
D η  
0.26 0.25  0.21  0 Pre-reform 
19 . 0 =
D η  










30 . 0 =
D η  
0.30 0.29  0.23  0 Post-reform 
35 . 0 =
D η  
0.35 0.34 0.26  0 
   x
Table 10: Employment and wage volatility in response to TFP and output volatility (with state and industry 
fixed effects) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Vol(work)  Vol(w)  Vol(rw)  Vol(workmd)  Vol(wmd)  Vol(rwmd) 
post91 0.018  -0.006  -0.009  0.002  -0.005  -0.003 
 (1.41)  (1.01)  (1.25)  (0.19)  (0.87)  (0.37) 
Vol(TFP) 0.828  0.089  0.294       
 (7.81)***  (1.65)*  (4.76)***       
Vol(TFPmd)       0.757 0.089  0.327 
       (7.79)***  (1.70)*  (5.46)*** 
Vol(TFP)*post91 -0.033 0.298 0.187      
 (0.16)  (2.92)***  (1.60)       
Vol(TFPmd)*post91       0.195  0.375  0.520 
       (1.12)  (4.00)***  (4.87)*** 
Observations 809  809  809  808  808  808 
R-squared 0.32  0.18  0.25  0.37  0.17  0.28 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Vol(work)  Vol(w)  Vol(rw)  Vol(workmd)  Vol(wmd)  Vol(rwmd) 
tariff -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
 (0.32)  (0.15)  (0.79)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (1.08) 
Vol(TFP) 0.661  0.434  0.427       
 (1.85)*  (2.80)***  (2.46)**       
Vol(TFPmd)       1.126  0.859 1.201 
       (2.80)***  (4.46)***  (5.54)*** 
Vol(TFP)*tariff 0.002  -0.001  0.001       
 (0.70)  (0.72)  (0.49)       
Vol(TFPmd)*tariff       0.000  -0.004  -0.004 
       (0.04)  (2.29)**  (2.33)** 
Observations 545  545  545 544  544  544 
R-squared 0.30  0.22  0.32  0.38  0.23  0.38 
 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Vol(work)  Vol(w)  Vol(rw)  Vol(workmd)  Vol(wmd)  Vol(rwmd) 
post91 0.015  -0.006  -0.010  -0.002  -0.006  -0.004 
  (1.56) (1.03)  (1.44) (0.27)  (0.97)  (0.63) 
Vol(out)  0.583 0.148  0.212 0.611  0.101  0.162 
  (20.40)*** (8.06)*** (10.19)*** (23.35)***  (5.40)***  (7.50)*** 
Vol(out)*post91 0.094  -0.015  -0.044  -0.038  -0.013  -0.040 
 (2.16)**  (0.53)  (1.38)  (0.92)  (0.45)  (1.18) 
Observations  809 809  809 808  808  808 
R-squared 0.61 0.25  0.33 0.64  0.18  0.26 
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Vol(work)  Vol(w)  Vol(rw)  Vol(workmd)  Vol(wmd)  Vol(rwmd) 
tariff  -0.000  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
 (2.00)**  (0.66)  (1.62)  (0.75)  (0.09)  (0.92) 
Vol(out)  0.789  0.110 0.126 0.608  0.063  0.060 
  (11.26)*** (2.89)*** (3.00)*** (7.32)***  (1.18)  (0.99) 
Vol(out)*tariff  -0.002  0.000 0.001 -0.000  0.000  0.001 
 (2.83)***  (1.32)  (1.99)**  (0.25)  (0.75)  (1.52) 
Observations  545  545 545 544  544  544 
R-squared  0.61  0.32 0.42 0.65  0.21  0.34 
Notes.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses. (*) significant at 10% level; (**) significant at 5% level; (***) 
significant at 1% level.   